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exist, though I think we can do so only after careful definition; but even if we do, we may still hold that such values need not be self-evident, and ask under what conditions they are to be recognized. As for "independence of all practical considerations," that is a phrase too vague to be helpful unless interpreted; and if it be interpreted as making the esthetic attitude the polar antithesis of the practical, it seems to be setting up an unnecessary and untenable dualism. For my part, I believe that a better point of departure would be the conception of beauty not as something *aimed at by* an experience, but as something which *comes to be recognized in* an experience. If this is what Aquinas meant by calling it a formal, not a final, cause, he was profoundly right.

CHARLES E. WHITMORE.

NORTHAMPTON, MASSACHUSETTS.

BOOK REVIEWS

Foundations of Formal Logic. H. BRADFORD SMITH. University of Pennsylvania Press, 1922. 56 pp.

In this pamphlet, which is intended for use in the classroom, Mr. Smith treats some of the problems of logic from a very special angle, so that we can not leave the work without the question—are these the foundations of logic? Modern mathematical logic has so broadened the Aristotelian and Mediæval conceptions of the subject that we anticipate much more than a treatment of the syllogism in a paper which has the mathematical form; and yet Mr. Smith restricts himself to the syllogism, its moods and figures, with a few paragraphs on immediate inference. The exposition makes use of a quasi-mathematical symbolism which involves many of the ideas of more familiar logical calculuses, but the total impression is one of clumsiness and inelegance. Though the avowed purpose of such a symbolism is to add clarity, Mr. Smith's symbols confuse rather than illuminate: his system lacks the simplicity and completeness which we have been led to expect from mathematical logic.

We are able, however, to extract the following points from the paper: (1) Mr. Smith believes that the subject-matter of logic is a certain number of propositions about classes. "The problem of a deductive science," he tells us, "is to define its elements . . . by an enumeration of their formal properties. The task of logic is, then, to develop its own system by constructing all the true and all the untrue propositions into which its elements enter exclusively." These elements are, for Mr. Smith, classes. This is a debatable point since we have learned from Peano and Russell, from Couturat and

others, that logic need not confine itself to classes and class relationships, that among its elements are to be found propositional functions, propositions, concepts, relations, operations—entities in terms of which classes can be defined but which are not classes. This is one reason why Mr. Smith's book is misnamed: a study of the fundamentals of logic should include more than propositions (or propositional functions) about classes. A class calculus of any sort is not the whole of logic; it is merely one aspect of a subject which refuses to be confined within the narrow walls of definitions.

(2) The class calculus which Mr. Smith constructs—by the aid of Euler's circular diagrams—differs from other class calculuses in that its aim is to represent the varieties of the Aristotelian syllogism. He selects four basic types of proposition (about classes), which are roughly equivalent to the *A*, *I*, and *E* of traditional logic and which embody all of the possible relations between two classes. The syllogism is then described as a form of implication which determines the relation between classes *c* and *a* when any of these relations holds between *a* and *b*, and between *b* and *c* respectively. (By the untruths of logic, Mr. Smith means all of the possible ways of going astray in the syllogism, *i.e.*, all of the possible formal fallacies.) It is not surprising that this class calculus, despite its symbolic form, conveys no new information about the syllogism: there is probably no new information to be had; and the theory of the mediæval logicians, apart from the form of its expression, is as acceptable today as it was in the twelfth century. Logic has opened new avenues of speculation only by escaping the syllogism and by giving to it a subordinate, though necessary place, in wider systems.

(3) The discovery that there is a non-Aristotelian logic comes as a paradox in the seventh and eighth chapters of Mr. Smith's book. The author's postulates for the syllogism are susceptible of two interpretations in terms of classes; one of these involves the null and universal classes while the other does not involve these classes. We are told that the former, though further from ordinary intuition, is the more sufficient, and this is the non-Aristotelian logic. It is non-Aristotelian not because it deserts the syllogism, but because it interprets the *A*, *E*, *I*, and *O* propositions of Aristotle in a non-Aristotelian way—*i.e.*, through the null and universal classes. This suggests to us a still better reason for speaking of Mr. Smith's system as non-Aristotelian; a reason which would apply equally well to the interpretation which, by inference, he asserts to be Aristotelian. Aristotle did not believe that logic deals with classes but with subjects and predicates, the subjects being individuals, or first substances, and the predicates universals. Aristotelian logic is a sub-

ject-predicate logic, and subjects and predicates need not be classes. This is the burden of such writers as Mr. Bosanquet, who show that Aristotle is concerned with universals or concepts—with genera, species, definitions, propria—and not with classes.

It is apparent from what has been said that the *Foundations of Formal Logic* takes us only a short distance into the subject and over controversial ground. Its chief merit will be to give to the student a thorough understanding of the syllogism in a form which is superficially different from that of the usual text-book. However, the value of such quasi-mathematical expositions of the syllogism, if they do not embody new ideas, is questionable, and a teacher of conservative temper might prefer the less complex and more lucid methods of the older logic.

RALPH M. EATON.

HARVARD COLLEGE.

The Æsthetic Attitude. HERBERT SIDNEY LANGFELD. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Howe. 1920. Pp. xi + 287.

In his preface, Professor Langfeld says modestly that his book is a "description only of those problems which I consider fundamental and which I hope will serve as an introduction to more extensive study." A reading of the table of contents appears to bear out this promise of a somewhat one-sided treatment of the subject. Professor Langfeld is primarily the psychologist, concerned largely with problems of the esthetic experience. Furthermore, it is as the instructor of the entirely uninitiated that he writes. His book is frankly elementary, painstakingly supplying definitions and elucidations of the simplest matters. For the most part it is clear and instructive though remarks on page 16 might well cause bewilderment even in those inured to the difficulties of the subject. On that page Professor Langfeld says that "Psychology must analyze the behavior of the observer in so far as the peculiar adjustment called 'aesthetics' is concerned"—which may of course be a misprint, but even at that would leave some things to be explained.

As an introduction to the definition of the "science" of esthetics and of the esthetic attitude, Professor Langfeld quotes from contemporary writings on the subject. He then briefly discusses the various arts to show what factors in them favor that attitude. Two chapters he devotes to the subject of empathy, and by citations from Karl Groos, Lipps, and Vernon Lee renders intelligible this "motor theory" of esthetic experience. Two chapters also he gives to "Unity," discussing first the psychological process by which unity is won out of diversity, and next its place in the various arts.